Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1986

Kelly Arlin Black v. McDonald's of Layton and or
State Insurance Fund : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James R. Black, Black and Moore; Attorney for Defendant.
Wendell E. Bennett; Attorney for Plaintiff.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Black v. McDonald's of Layton, No. 860296.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1188

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

45.9
DOCKET K

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KELLY ARLIN BLACK,
Appellant/Plaintiff,
vs.

(Argument Priority No. 6)
Indust. Cfc>mm. #85000922

MCDONALD'S OF LAYTON, and/or
STATE INSURANCE FUND,

Case No. 1860296

Respondents/Defendants.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
James R. Blick
BLACK & MOORE
Attorney for Defendant
261 East Brbadway, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Wendell E. Bennett
Attorney for Plaintiff
448 East 400 South, Suite 304
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

N0VZ4iS86J

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KELLY ARLIN BLACK,

:

Appellant/Plaintiff,
vs.

:

(Argument Priority No. 6)

: Indust. Comm. #85000922

MCDONALD'S OF LAYTON, and/or
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Respondents/Defendants.

:
Case No. 860296

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
James R. Black
BLACK & MOORE
Attorney for Defendant
261 East Broadway, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Wendell E. Bennett
Attorney for Plaintiff
448 East 400 South, Suite 304
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

TABLE OF CONTENTS
f&3§
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

4

ARGUMENT

5

POINT I:

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECISION DENYING
BENEFITS TO KELLY ARLIN
BLACK SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED BECAUSE
THE INJURY SUSTAINED BY
MR. BLACK CLEARLY DID NOT ARISE OUT OF OR IN
THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT

POINT II: THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECISION WHICH
DENIED WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION BENEFITS TO
KELLY ARLIN
BLACK WAS
NOT ARBITRARY OR
CAPRICIOUS, WHOLLY WITHOUT CAUSE, OR WITHOUT
ANY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
TO
SUPPORT IT;
AND THEREFORE THE ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION MAY NOT BE OVERTURNED

19

CONCLUSION

20

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Auejbach_COj Vj, Industrial Commissisn,
113 Utah 347, 195 P.2d~2457~246 "(1948)

5,6f7

396 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965)

18

DsPSU^iJi5_2f_5i3i£I}_Y J _£s?iJ33_5a£-2fiIDP5Iiy/
243 S o . 2 d 561 ( M i s s . 1971)

17

MiM2£-££§§l,£Q12QI2£iQQ-3*-EQn£L23i,

631 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah 1981)
l£lly_yJ_Ha5JSSD5a£js_t7ai£X_£fiIPpany,
Super. 528, 77 A.2d 467 (1950)

19
10 NJ
18

JLinjje_:v_t_ Iudus^iial_£sinffij:£.si£n,
609 P.2d 926, at 928.

(Utah 1980)

78 A r i z . 4 0 1 , 281 P.2d 113, 115 (1955)

8
16, 17

Lypiai3^a-R255_Bxfii;]35i5_5_Mi?j3isfim£j:y_y^Industiial-Commission, 36 m . 2d 410,
223 N.E.2d 150 (1967)

17

UaxiiDS5J3_y J _S?rfi_lDSiiiail££_^S£12£ya_lD£ J f
606 P.2d 2 5 6 , 258 (1980)

9

Rosg_y^_Ai3finaiji-ii3Si!xan££_Ci3mpaiii£Sr
77 Or. App. 167, 711 P.2d 218 (1985)

15

s_taJssj3i5_y^_UJ3ii£<3_^y£iiisiDs_Cfimpany,
110 Conn. 384, 148 A. 334 (1930)

17

SJ^piijLy^lBdjJS^Iial-C^mJflisSiSB,
2 Utah 2d 270, 272 P.2d 187, 188,
190 (1954)

ii

8,9

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED

82 Am. Jur. 2d,

10

Utah Code Annotated, Section
35-1-45 (1953, as amended)
Larson,
Tti&XkmenlS-Sswss&satiQn-Lay,
Vol. 1A

5
10

Larson, mxkmenls-ZmssnsatiQn-bay,
Vol. 1A Section 22.24 (a) p. 5-139

11

Larson, Eoj;]srDe^5_C^Bpe^ajfciSD-Latf,
Vol. 1A Section 22.24 (b) p

11

Lar son, Koj;Jsme^£-Cj2ffiP£D£a£i£B_Latf,
Vol. 1A Section 22.24 (c)

12

Larson, EoxkjpejjJs_C^psusaiioji_Latf,
Vol. 1A Section 22.24 (d)

13

Lar s o n , J&iJsiPSiiis. Cj>np£B£a£iojJ_Latf,
Vol. 1A Section 22.33

14, 19

iii

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OP UTAH
KELLY ARLIN BLACK,

:

Appellant/Plaintiff,
vs.
MCDONALD'S OF LAYTON, and/or
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Respondents/Defendants.

:

(Argument Priority No. 6)

:

Indust. Comm. #85000922

:
Case No. 860296

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

1.

Was the plaintiff, Kelly Arlin Black acting in the course

and scope of his employment with McDonald's of Layton when
driving to

a softball

struck and injured by

he was

game against McDonald's of North Ogden and
another

vehicle

while

traveling

to that

game?
2.

Was

the

Industrial

Commission's decision which denied

Workmen's Compensation benefits to

Kelly

Arlin

Black, arbitrary

and capricious or wholly without cause?

1.

On

June 13,

1985, Kelly

automobile accident when the car
truck.

(R 43, 44)

Arlin Black
he

was

driving

other

Immediately

McDonalds

was

hit

by a

On the day in question, Mr. Black was employed

by McDonald's of Layton as a crew trainer.
2.

was injured in an

of

before

the

Layton

employees

(R 19)

accident,
were

Mr.

Black

and four

on

their

way to a

Softball

game

against

the

employees

from

the

North

Ogden

McDonalds. (R 44)
3.

The

Softball

games

in

question

were

employees of the various participating McDonalds
established

divisions

regulations.
4.

within

league

league

the

was

composed

of

rules

and

McDonalds stores

an area from Salt Lake to Tooele to Ogden.

At the beginning of

contributed approximately

the season

$25.00 or

The stores

(R 311, 312, 117)

each participating store

$35.00 to the league for the

purchase of scorebooks, softballs and trophies.
by the

Restaurants, who

and

themselves participated on a voluntary basis.
5.

by

(R 250, 258)

The softball

ranging in

the

organized

This fee was paid

Layton McDonalds on behalf of its employees.

(R 294, 297,

313)
6.

Trophies

division, the
money remaining
trophies would

were

offered

play-off runner
after the

to

the

winning

purchase of

scorebooks, softballs and

the store

itself and

(R 33, 291, 292, 263, 64)

At the end

of the 1985 season the championship
runner-up team received $30.00.
McDonalds

these softball games
bulletin board
employees.

The

be divided 75% to the championship team and 25% to

not the individual players.

The

of each

up and the play-off champion.

the runner-up team, which money would go to

7.

teams

of

through

$90.00 and the

(R 264)

Layton
a

team received

employees

sign-up

sheet

were informed of
on

the employee

and were also told about the games by their fellow

(R 25, 31, 83, 116, 306, 353, 355)
2

7.

The fact that

play softball

prospective

employee

may

or

may not

has never been a condition of employment and has no

bearing on whether or
Layton.

a

not

a

person

is

hired

at

McDonalds of

(R 76, 106r 107f 195)

8.

Employee

participation

in

these

softball

completely voluntary and no one was required to play.

games was
(R25f 111,

198, 257, 307)
9.

Any employee

who wished to participate in the games had

to find a work replacement or
or she

request time

off in

was scheduled to work during a game.

no priority treatment regarding scheduling.

advance if he

The players received
(R 30,

84, 112, 163,

166, 197)
10.

The

employees

were

participating in the games.
not receive,

neither were

not paid for the time they spent

(R 26, 84, 197, 289,
they offered

307)

any free

They did

food, drink or

special privileges or benefits in connection with participation in
these softball games.
11.

The

(R 72, 121, 200, 307)

employees

found

their own transportation to the

games, volunteering the use

of their

own transportation

expenses.

and gas

vehicles, and

paying their

(R 30, 31, 112, 113, 198,

309)
12.
park.

Each home team
The

Layton

Park in Clearfield.
diamond.

was

responsible

McDonald's

for

reserving

a ball

home games were played at Fisher

There was no cost for the use of the softball

(R 24, 25, 72, 113, 303, 304)

3

13.

The McDonalds

softballs at the home
mitts, bats

of Layton provided the scorebook and the

games.

and any

The employees

other equipment

furnished their own

at all

games.

(R 31f 114,

199)
14.

During the 1985 season some of

given Tee-shirts

that were

1984.

simple,

They were

McDonalds logo

or symbol

purchased by
numbered

by the

The

players at

baseball

shirts

and

had no

were not designed to in

shirts were

the end

players were

the Layton McDonalds in

whatsoever and

any way advertise McDonalds.
the store

the Layton

to be

returned to

of the season.

(R 32f 33,

114, 115, 200)
15.

These games were not advertised by

McDonalds of Layton,

and the softball league was not designed to advertise McDonalds in
any way.

(R

115,

244)

There

was

no

financial

benefit to

McDonalds of Layton for participating in these games, and the only
benefit to
morale.

the

store

was

perhaps

an

improvement

in employee

(R 107, 119, 291)
SUMMARY.. OF, ARGUMENT

Kelly Arlin
out of or
Layton,

Black alleges that he sustained injuries arising

during
and

benefits.

the

therefore

employment,

employer.

he

of

employment

with

McDonalds of

is entitled to Workmen's Compensation

It is respondents contention that when this

sustained, Mr. Black
his

course

was not acting within the course or scope of

nor

Rather,

injury was

for

he was

a

purpose

which

would

benefit

his

engaged in an activity that had as its

4

main

purpose

to serve

the social

aspectf

or other personal

diversion of the employee.
hRQumm
POINT I

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECISION DENYING
BENEFITS TO KELLY ARLIN BLACK SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE INJURY
SUSTAINED BY
MR. BLACK CLEARLY DID NOT ARISE OUT OF OR IN
THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT.
The Workers1 Compensation Act of Utah
tion to be paid

provides for compensa-

only to an employee who is injured "by accident

arising out of or in the course of his employment."
Ann. Section

35-1-45 (1953,

as amended.)

law and other authorities in the area
lawr there

Utah Code

According to Utah Case

of Worker's Compensation

are a number of elements that must be considered when

an employee

is injured

in connection

with playing

on a company

team.
The

Utah

case

of h&eih&sh

£&» x^InSiiStxial-GsmmissiQii

113 Utah 347f 195 P.2d 245 (1948) is strikingly similar
present case.

to the

An employee of Auerbach Company was injured in an

automobile accident while enroute to play
sponsored by the company.

This

basketball

on a team

team was part of the companyfs

public relations and advertising campaign.
Miss Wardle

#

The injured employee.

was not hired as a basketball player and she was paid

only for her work as a cashier.
by her employer when

However, her expenses were paid

she travelled

with the team.

basketball was not a condition of employment when
and her involvement with

Her playing

she was hired,

the team was completely voluntary. The
5

team

was

known

as

the

uniforms with the word
the

players

on

the

"Auerbachs

"Shamrocks" printed
team

were

income from the games went to
place at

Shamrocks",

night, after

thereon.

they wore
Not all of

employees of Auerbachsf and any

the

her duties

and

company.

The

at Auerbachfs

accident took
had ended.

195

P.2d at 245.
The Industrial Commission found that Miss
in the

course of

her employment.

disagreed and set aside the award.

On

Wardle was injured

appeal, the Supreme Court

The

Supreme Court considered

the following facts to be important:
(a)

the Company

did not

employ Miss Wardle as a basketball

player;
(b)

she was not required to participate in the games; and

(c)

she was not paid as a cashier on

a basis

the

as

playing

of

basketball

that included

an

element

of

qualification.
The court stated, "The issue is limited to

a question

of whether

or not as part of her employment as cashier she was under the duty
of playing basketball.

We think not."

Id. at 246.

The court further stated:
In this case, one of the most important
elements of the master-servant relationship
is missing—that of the right to control the
employment.
Right to control in this case
does not mean merely coaching control, the
purpose of which is to produce teamwork when
the alleged employee plays; but means the
right to require performance of a duty to
play, if such a duty exists. * * *
Participants in a contest are subject to
control for the purposes of safety; teamwork
6

on a basketball
for
purposes
Neither howeverf
by the Workmen's

team is subject to control
of
efficiency in playing.
is the control contemplated
Compensation Act*

Id. at 246.
According

to

the

elements

Auerbacfr decision, Kelly Black
be said

outlined

and the

by

others in

court in the
his car cannot

to have been injured during the course and scope of their

employment.
were not

In the

present casef

employed as

as in

Auerbach* the employees

Softball players, they were not required to

participate in the games, and they were not
a basis

the

that included

playing Softball

part of their employment for

paid by

as a

McDonalds,

the

qualification.
occupants

Blackfs car were under no duty to play Softball.
element of the employer's

right

present case, just as it was in

to

McDonalds on

control

As

of Kelly

Furthermore, the

is

missing

in the

hii£Lb2£h*

The present facts amount to an even stronger case for finding
no course of employment than the
In

this

case,

McDonalds

gained

the

employees

here

Auerbachs;

facts in

the Auerbach decision.

no advertising benefits as did
did

not

receive transportation

expenses as did the Auerbachs employees; and McDonalds received no
financial benefit from these
received

income

from

the

games whatsoever,

whereas Auerbachs

games, although an amount that hardly

kept up with team expenses.

Accordingly/

Mr.

Black

should be

denied worker's compensation benefits.
On page

six of

petitioners appellate

Auerbach decision because that case was
concept

of

the

Workman's

Compensation
7

brief, he attacks the

decided in
Law

has

1948 and "the
substantially

changed, and other Utah cases have seemed to retreat from
the rationale of that decision."
However,

the Auerbach

overruled, or even
decision.

In fact,

(Petitioners Brief page 6.)

decision

questioned

has never

by any subsequent

been reversed,
Supreme Court

it was cited as authoritative as recently as

1980 in the KinDS^jL^In^liSirli^l^smmiSSlQHr

(Utah 1980)

some of

decision.

609 P. 2d 926,

at 928.

It is therefore still a valid and binding

precedent for the present case.
The applicant also cites the case

of ££ZQU£

su^InAiiSillAl

Soromj-spjlppy 2 Utah 2d 270f 272 P.2d 187 (1954) in support of his
position.
old

Aside from the fact that the Stroud case

as the Auerbach

distinguished
the injured

decision,

entirely

from

police officer

the facts

the present

is nearly as

in that case can be
facts.

In gtroudf

was at the police station on his day

off in order to check out a police car to two other officers. The
men he was to meet were delayed, and Mr. Stroud began transferring
beverages to his automobile while waiting
was killed

while thus

held

that

arrival. He

engaged, when his gun fell and discharged,

the bullet entering Stroudfs heart.
Court

for their

Stroud

272 P.2d at 188.

was killed

during

The Supreme

the course of his

employment, for reasons that are not present in the instant case:
"Stroud was authorized and required to carry
his gun during his working hours; he carried
it for the benefit of his employer and the
employer thus was on notice that an accident
of this type is an ordinary risk of a police
officer.
He had not abandoned his occupation
and was performing the duty of waiting for
the other officers."
272 P.2d at 190.

Stroud is therefore not persuasive here.
8

Applicant

relies

Assncy^

Ins^r

Howeverf

even

Insurance
claim.

next

on

606

the

case

P.2d

according

256

of

Martipgpp

(1980)

to

Yj^WrM

support his

to the standards announced in

Martinson# Mr. Black and the other car occupants

were outside the

course of their employment at the time of the accident.

The first

test stated in H&xtiiiSQn is "whether

one which

someone else

the

a

trip

is

would have had to make for the employer at some time

if the claimant had not."
made

such

trip

to

606 P.2d

the

game,

at 258.

the

Had

Mr. Black not

employer would not have sent

another employee in his place, because softball game participation
was

purely

voluntary,

and

benefit from the games

McDonalds of Layton gained no direct

and had

no interest

in directing

any of

its employees to attend.
The

second

"whether the
the trip

and

paramount or

or other

more relevant test of t&ai±in£QQ is

perhaps

predominant motivation

activity is

and purpose of

to serve the employer's interest,

and the social aspects, or other diversion for one's own interest,
is merely

adjunctive thereto."

I£.

may have benefitted indirectly
improved employee

morale, it

purpose of the games

was to

fact,

is

the

opposite

Although McDonalds of Layton

from

the

softball

games through

cannot be said that the predominant
serve the

true.

The

employer's interest.

In

predominant motivation and

purpose of the activity was in serving the social aspect, or other
personal

diversion

again points to the

of

the

employees.

conclusion that

course of employment.
9

(R 291, 107, 263)

there was

no injury

This
in the

Petitioners

reliance

claim is also misplaced.
petitioner,

the

so

on
As

82

Am. Jur. 2d

stated

called

in

"trend"

the

as supporting his
sections

throughout

the

quoted by
country of

finding persons engaged in company sponsored recreational activity
to be

within the

scope of their employment when injured is based

upon a number of
case.

The

elements that

citation

mentions

whether the injury occurred
working hoursf
eventf

whether

event.

not present

in this

the importance of such factors as

on or

off employer

premises, during

whether the employer required participation in the

activity, and
the

simply were

the

employer

the extent
All

of

derived

some

benefit

from

the

of employer control or participation in

these

elements

are

discussed

in Larson,

W&ikmnls-QQmsensstiQn-haM, vol IA.
By

examining

the

Larson

treatise,

and applying its basic

tenets to the facts and testimony of the case at bar, it
that

Mr. Kelly

Black

was

not

acting

within

is clear

the scope of his

employment at the time he incurred injuries.
Professor Larson, in his
Law,

discusses

the

problem

of

employees

result of their participation

in company

gories

evolved

of

tests

that

have

ESLLkmenlS-QQR&ens&tlQn

treatise on

who are injured as a

teams.

The four cate-

from various jurisdictions

include:
(a)

whether the games take place on or off

the premises and

in or out of working hours;
(b)

employer initiative;

(c)

employer contribution of money or equipment; and
10

(d)

quantities and types of employer benefit.

Larson,

Workmen's

Coipp.gnsatifii3„L3w,

Vol,

1A Section 22.24 (a)

p. 5-139.

The first element discussed by Larson
of the

activity in

question.

on the employer's premises
has

been

seen

to

be

is the

time and place

He states that if a game is played

during

clear."

working

hours "compensability

Larson, supra, Section 22.24(b).

Likewise, the opposite is also true:
"[I]f the games are played both off the
premises and
after hours, the burden of
proving work-connection falls heavily on the
factors of employer initiative, financing,
and benefit, and a showing on these points
which might have sufficed in a case with some
time or place work-coiinection may well prove
to be inadequate. Id.
In the
played off
hours.

present case, the Softball games in question were all
of

the

employer's

premises

and

during non-working

Applicant has therefore failed to meet the time and place

test as outlined.

Professor
states:

"If

Larson,
the

. . the

actively

of

have

organized

initiative,
activity

footing from, for example,
was

speaking

employees

entirely on their own
employer .

in

promoted

begins

no

on

an

[a] recreational

by

having a paid supervisor."

with

employer

the

employer,

initiative,

a Softball league

suggestion

from the

entirely

different

program .

. . which

even to the extent of

Larson, supra, Section 22.24 (c).

11

In the present casef the softball
number of
league.

McDonalds employees

They originally

John Parisi,
Office.

started when a

expressed an interest in forming a

coordinated

their

efforts

through Mr.

an operations consultant for the McDonalds Salt Lake

(R 226)

helping with

league was

Mr. Parisi volunteered his

the league

because he

time and

efforts in

had been involved in similar

leagues while working for McDonalds in Los Angeles.

(R

232)

The

Utah games began in 1983, when some McDonalds employees approached
Mr. Parisi and desired to play softball.
received no
program.

encouragement in

(R 232-233).

Mr. Parisi

1983 from the company to set up the

(R 235)

In 1984 and 1985 alsof employees
softball to

expressed a

desire to play

Mr. Parisif so he helped them get organized.

(R 241,

249f 250)
A meeting was held in May of 1985 with the
crew

people

as

opposed

interested in playing.
team captains

to

(R

250)

were elected

playing divisions,

management

established the

(R 250)

teams also

furnished their

players.

(R 16, 202, 310)

who

were

treasurers and

present, who

rules and

during the playing season were handled
252) The

personnel,

Commissionersf

among those

They handled the entire program.

employees, mostly

set up the

handled the money.

Any problems that arose

by the

Commissioners.

own umpires

(R

from among the

Release forms were also drafted up for

employees to sign so that it would be understood that the softball
games were not sanctioned functions of

12

McDonalds.

(R 257)

Mr.

Parisi was

of the

opinion that

not involved with the games,
These

facts

all

employer initiative

the corporation of McDonalds was

(R 258)

indicate

that

there

was

little

if any

in that the games were organized, policed and

conducted by the employees themselves.
^„Finan£ial_Suppoit_3I^
This third test of
of financial

work-connection'concerns

support, athletic

the employer."

"the furnishing

equipmentf prizes and the like by

Larson, supra, Section

22f24(d).

In speaking on

this element, professor Larson states:
Although facts of this kind are helpful in
building a
cumulative
case
of employer
involvement,
standing
alone
they
are
ordinarily not enough to meet the burden of
proof.
Among the tangible employer contributions that have failed to produce compensability are these:
$1000 for equipment,
which was dispensed through regular company
forms and was stored on company premises; a
$500 subsidy; equipment and a $50 entrance
fee; uniforms and the Industrial League fee;
uniforms, equipment, and fees; an allowance
of $225; a grant of $150 over a two-year
period.
Larson, supra, Section 22.24(d).
There is conflicting
McDonalds

of

Layton

evidence

contributed

as
to

to
the

the

amount

Softball

of money

team.

testimony at the depositions estimated $25.00 to $35.00.
254, 294)

In

by

which

Larson

registration

The

(R 119,

any event, compared to the amounts that were cited

fee

failed
to

to

cover

produce
the

softballs and a small cash prize

13

cost

compensability,
of

a

$35.00

trophies, scorebooks,

hardly amounts

to the necessary

financial support

needed to

establish activity within the course

of employment.
It

Eipplfiy£i_B£ii£fi;fc
McDonalds of Layton received

advertising benefit

as a

neither

result of

financial

the games

benefit nor

in question.

only benefit the employer received was perhaps improved
its employees

who participated

in the

The

morale of

Softball league.

(R 107)

Touching this area, Professor Larson writes:
Controversy is encountered also
when the
benefit asserted is the intangible value of
increased
worker
efficiency
and morale.
Basically, the trouble with this argument is
not that such benefits do not result, but
that they result from every game the employee
plays whether connected with his work or not.
In this respectf the argument is reminiscent
of the same view sometimes heard in connection
with the
personal comfort cases; eating,
resting, and the like do indeed improve the
efficiency of
the employee, but this is
equally true (and even more true) of the
sleeping and eating which he does at home.
And so, just as in the sleeping and eating
cases some arbitrary time and space limitations must circumscribe the area within which
the "benefit" establishes work-connection, the
recreation cases must submit to some similar
limitation,
since
otherwise there is no
stopping point which can be defined short of
complete
coverage
of all the employeefs
refreshing social and recreational activities.

I t sac he taJ££D ajs_£b£_iBajGri:ty-Yi£H-£ha£
£h£§§-&Qi&l£ an&sliiQienQY
hensiitssis^nQt
alcce ficsusb tc bLing-L&£L£a£iQn-xi£hin-.£h£
c o u r s e Q£ jeinplQyiDfiBi.
footnotes dropped.)

(Emphas i s

added;

Larson, supra, Section 22.33.
Again, the

applicant fails

stated.
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this final

test for the reasons

A

recent

case

petitioner's claim

from

another

that the

jurisdiction

which

refutes

"trend" throughout the country is in

favor with allowing compensation in a case such as the

one at bar

is Mss^XjL^hxgQnaiit-InsiHLanss-QQmsanies, 77 Or. App. 167, 711 P.2d
218 (1985).

In Rose/

an employee

suffered injury

game played by a company team after work.
employee's injury during the
where

the

game

occurred

The court held that the

softball game
after

work

was not

hours

and

employer did not organizef manage, or control the
were not

work related
off premises/

team, employees

required to play, employer's only contribution was $100,

and employer's
through

in a Softball

only

jerseys.

benefit
The

was

court

so

indirect
held

encouraged employees to sell cars (engage

advertising received

even though the employer
in business)

at games,

and even though employer encouraged players to play on the team.
Thus,

it

is

readily

apparent

that when the factors which

Larson speaks of in his treatise are in
EQ&S,

as

accord with

the facts in

well as in the case at bar, it is incumbent upon a court

to find that the injury

sustained

was

not

incurred

during the

course of employment.
On

page

9

of

the

Petitioner's

brief

he states that the

employer made "strong overtures that participation in the softball
program

would

be

looked

upon

favorably",

"indirect and compelling pressure" to attend
the

testimony

in

the

was

amounting

the games.

to

However,

depositions consistently established that

softball playing was never
participation

thus

a

strictly
15

condition
voluntary.

of

employment
Kelly

Black

and that
himself

testified that the person
indicated that
ment

who interviewed

playing softball

(R 76)

and

Furthermore, the

that

was a

participation

him for

his job never

pre-requisite for employwas

voluntary.

(R 25)

gentleman who interviewed Mr. Black testified as

follows:
Q. . . .
When you interview people for
employment, do you ever make it a rule to
discuss the softball games with them?
A. No.
Q.
Does the fact that whether or not a
prospective employee plays softball make any
difference in your decision whether or not to
hire them?
A.

Absolutely not.

Q.
So if you do discuss the subject of
softball, what's the purpose of it?
A.
It's
Interview.
(R 106, 107)

never

during

the

There is conflicting evidence as to whether or not

softball was discussed at
However,

discussed

there

is

no

Mr. Black's

doubt

that

pre- employment interview.
playing softball was never a

condition of employment at McDonalds of Layton.

(R 195)

The case relied upon by the applicant on this pointf Lattices
v. Industrial

£Qmmi££iQn-Q£

(1955) is inapplicable.
decision

by

the

'encouragement'
the facts

language

by

Ariz. 401, 281 P.2d 113

cited

no occasion

received

the LatfI£B££

the

to hold

constituted

Commission

the

of the employer's business plan."
16

from

is merely dictum, because the court

bar presents

petitioner

established

integral part

The

applicant

stated, "the case at

AlJLzfiBSf 78

that the

direction.
luncheon

On

was an

281 P.2d at 115.

Because
attended

the employer 1 s
by

benefits.

business

the employee

was advanced

prior

to

at

the meeting

his injury, he was awarded

There are no similar facts in the present case.

The cases listed in the string cite on page 8 supporting the
Applicant's

argument

that

a

suggestion

employer is tantamount to an express
able from

the case

at hand.

^Y£l£i£iBS„££IDP3Dyr
claimant had

HO

received a

the company picnic.

or encouragement by an

order are also distinguish-

For instance, in SijSJsfiDis^^^^UDiifid

Conn.

384, 148 A.

direct order

The employees

334

(1930), the

from his foreman to attend

who attended

were

paid and

those who did not attend were not paid, and the employer provided
transportation to the event.
able .

In

The

facts are clearly not compar-

Lykx3B^„£jQ££„£l^^

Cpmmi ssion, 3^ 111. 2d 410, 223 N.E.2d 150 (1967), the golf outing
held

in

regular

connection
working

compulsion to

with

day.

the claimants
The court

found

injury

was held on a

substantial

employer

attend because the employees were paid whether they

attended the outing or not, and

those

required to work their regular duties.

who did

not attend were

The employer also supplied

food, drinks and prizes.
in the case Uesen&snts

Gas^QQmsanx, 243

£l_£fca:fc£D iU-Etfius

So.2d 561 (Miss. 1971), the employee died on an employer sponsored
fishing trip

and worker's

dependents because

compensation benefits

were denied the

there was no employer compulsion to attend and

there was no showing of substantial benefit to

the employer, even

though one of the purposes of the event was to improve employer17

employee

relationships.

this

case supports the

position of defendants. Eelly-X^-BaskenssLSk^atsi

Qomsany, 10 NJ

Super.

528,

77

A.2d

If

467

employee was injured at an
costs of

the outing

anything,

(1950)
outing

is also distinguishable.
where

the

employer

paid the

along with the wages of employees attending.

The outing was also a benefit bargained for in the
with the

The

wage agreement

employer, and it provided the employer an opportunity to

make speeches

and

present

awards

to

employees.

Ql^ysnaSI^^^LibSI^^Bii^&l^InSiil&nQS^QQ^,

Civ. App. 1965)f the court relied

Finallyr in

396 S.W.2d 174 (Tex.

on Professor

Larson's treatise

as outlined in defendant's original Memorandum, and cited the rule
that an

employer

activity

in

must

derive
h£XQnd

question

a

substantial

the

intangible

employee health and morale before

he

will

be

benefit

from the

value of improved
found

within the

course of employment.
Although there
the sole

basis

employee

relations

should

be

Professor

may be

that

a few

the
and

event
builds

disregarded.
Larson,

a

As

noted

cases which
in

question

allow recovery on
provides improved

morale, these are a minority and
stated

authority

previously,
in

the

according

to

area of Worker's

Compensation law, the majority view is that "morale and efficiency
benefits

are

not

alone

course of employment."
1A Section 22.33.

enough

to

bring recreation within the

Larson, Workmen's

Compensation Law, Vol.

It is interesting to note that the petitioner's

brief fails to cite Larson altogether.
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POINT II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECISION WHICH
DENIED WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION BENEFITS TO
KELLY ARLIN
BLACK WAS
NOT ARBITRARY OR
CAPRICIOUS, WHOLLY WITHOUT CAUSE, OR WITHOUT
ANY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT; AND
THEREFORE
THE
ORDER
OF
THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION MAY NOT BE OVERTURNED.
The standard of review which has been utilized

by this Court

in Industrial Commission cases is stringent and there are numerous
cases which have articulated
the Utah

Supreme Court

forth

the

Commission.

proper

v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d

or scope

of review which

possesses with regard to decisions handed

down by the Industrial
sets

the power

One

standard

888

(Utah

is

such case
Kaiser

1981).

In

which clearly

Stssl

£fiiP£I3iiflI2

telSSI,

the Court

stated:
Under any of these standards . . . it is
apparent that
this
Courts1
function in
reviewing Commission findings of fact is a
strictly limited one in which the question is
not
whether
the
Court agrees with the
Commission's findings or whether they are
supported by the preponderance of evidence.
Instead, the reviewing court's inquiry is
whether
the
Commission's
findings
are
"arbitrary or capricious," or "wholly without
cause" or contrary to the "one [inevitable]
conclusion from the evidence" or viithout "any
substantial evidence" to support them. Only
then should the
Commissions
findings be
displaced.
631 P.2d at 890.
Accordingly, applying

the above

cited authority to the case

at bar, the Supreme Court is powerless to
Commission's

order

unless

clearly acted arbitrarily and
19

it

can

be

overturn the Industrial
said that the Commission

capriciously

in

denying Mr. Black

Workmenfs

Compensation

benefits.

Such

is not the case and the

decision is not subject to the Supreme Court's scope of review.
The

pertinent

facts

of

this

case

are

uncontradicted.

Mr. Black was

injured while enroute to a softball game.

was

place

to

take

Mr. Black's work

off

hours.

or control the team,
pate.

The

of
The

his

employers

and after

employer did not organize, arrange,

and Mr. Black

employers

premises

The game

was not

contribution

to

required to partici-

such

activity

minimal, and there was no direct benefit accruing

was very

to the employer

from such activity.
In determining

that Mr. Blackfs

injury did not occur within

the scope or course of his

employment, the

considered

this case, and applied the appropriate

the

facts

of

Utah case law which is consistent

with the

Industrial Commission

overwhelming majority

of case law in this country.
Thus, it

cannot be said the Industrial Commission's decision

was arbitrary or capricious, wholly without cause, or
one

inevitable

conclusion.

Accordingly,

the

contrary to

decision

of the

Commission is not subject to reversal.

Petitioner has failed to
support his

persuasive

authority to

According to the majority view, as stated in Utah

and other

decisions throughout the nation, the facts in

this case indicate that Mr. Black and
car were

any

claim of being injured within the course and scope of

his employment.
case law

cite

the other

occupants of his

not injured during the course and scope of their employ20

ment.

They were enroute to

an

activity

that

had

as

its main

purpose to serve the social aspect, or other personal diversion of
the employees*
Further, because the Industrial Commission's decision denying
benefits to

Mr. Black was

without cause, the decision

not arbitrary or capricious, or wholly
of the

Commission is

not subject to

reversal.
Therefore, respondents

herein respectfully

Utah Supreme Court affirm the order

of the

which denied benefits to Kelly Arlin Black.
DATED this /%_ day of November, 1986.
BLACK & MOORE
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request that the

Industrial Commission

£ERTJFI£ATE_QF_MILI!$S
I hereby

certify that

four true

and correct

copies of the

above and foregoing Brief of Respondent, was mailed, postage paid,
on the jH
^

day of November, 1986, to the following:
Wendell E. Bennett
Attorney at Law
448 East 400 South, Suite 304
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
Bradley H. Parker
Attorney at Law
505 East 200 South, #300
Salt Lake City, UT
84102
J. Mark Whimpey
2650 Washington Blvd., #101
Ogden, UT
84401
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